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This action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United
States, for the District of Missouri, to establish the freedom of
Scott, his wife and their two daughters, who were claimed and
held by Sandford, the defendant, as slaves.
The courts of the United States are not courts of general jurisdiction, having a right to hear and decide controversies of all kinds,
but have jurisdiction over, and authority to hear and determine
only certain specified cases, all of which are designated in the
Constitution of the United States. Among those cases so designated, are controversies between citizens of different States. It
follows, as a natural and logical sequence from this constitution of
the courts of the United States, that whenever a party commences
I This paper has been prepared by a very distinguished and able jurist, and is
presented to our readers as an excellent legal view of a difficult question; but the
editors of this journal do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion on
the subject matter in controversy. The opinions here stated are the author's own,
and cannot fail to be read with interest, from the calm and strictly legal ranner of
the discussion, whether the reader assent or dissent.-Eda. Am. Lat Reg.
VOL. VIL-21

SCOTT vs. SANDFORD.

an action in one of those courts, he must show on his pleadings
that he has a right to commence his suit in that court; or, in other
words, that the controversy between him and his adversary is one
of those specified in the Constitution of the United States, which
the courts thereof have a right to hear and decide. If he fails to
show this, his suit is always dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Scott, in his declaration, stated, that he was a citizen
of the State of Missouri, and Sandford, a citizen of the State of
Massachusetts; and hence the controversy to be heard and decided
was between citizens of different States.
Sandford, by his pleas, placed his defence on two grounds:
First.-lHe interposed a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the
court, and alleged that Scott was not a citizen of the State of
Missouri, because he was, "a negro of African descent; his ancestors
were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and
sold as negro slaves," and prayed judgment, that the court would
not take further cognizance of the action. Second.-He interposed
a plea in bar; and alleged, that Scott, his wife and daughters, were
hs slaves.
The fact stated by Sandford, in his plea in abatement, was
admitted by Scott to be true-viz., that he was, "a negro of African
descent," &c.
In answer to Sandford's plea in bar Scott replied and denied
that he, his wife and daughters, were slaves of Sandford, and insisted
that they were free.
Scott, to show that he, his wife and daughters, were free ; and
Sandford, to show that they were slaves ; relied on and inutually
admitted the following facts, (it is only necessary, however, for the
present purpose, to state those which relate to Scott,) viz: That
he was formerly a slave in Missouri; was taken by his then master
to the State of Illinois, and held there in servitude nearly two years,
and was from there taken to a territory of the United States west
of the Mississippi river, and north of thirty-six degrees and thirty
minutes of north latitude, and there held in servitude for more than
a year, and then, and in the year 1838, brought back to Missouri,
and there held in servitude, and sold, before this suit was commenced,
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to Sandford. While in the territory of the United States and in
the year 183, Scott was married to his wife, with the consent of
his and her then owner.
The case was twice elaborately argued. The jurisdiction of the
court depended on the question, whether Scott was a citizen of the
State of Missouri; and his freedom on the question, whether the
taking of a slave by his master into a free State to reside, by the
laws of which, slavery is prohibited, dissolves the relation of master
and slave, and constitutes the slave a freeman, and so fully and
absolutely, that if taken back again by his master into a slave State,
and there held in slavery, he can assert and maintain his freedom.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court, and in it
presents the arguments and propositions assented to and approved
by the majority.
To enable us to understand and form a correct judgment of the
positions advanced, we must keep in view the Constitution and law,
as they were generally understood in the country before the decision
of the -case under consideration.
Previous to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, each of the
thirteen States, then existing, was sovereign and independent.
They were united by a league, called the "Confederation," but by
entering into that league, they did not surrender any portion of
their sovereignty. Each State had and exercised the right of
determining who were, or who might become, citizens of it. The
confederation not being a government, and only a league between
sovereign States, had not, and could not have, citizens. The only
citizens there were, or could be, before the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, were citizens of the several States.
Among civilized nations, and especially those who have adopted
that system of law known as the English Common Law, there are
two, and only two classes of citizens. One acquire their citizenship
by birth, and the other by law. They are generally known and
distinguished by the appellatives "native," and "adopted."
When the Government of 'the United States was established by
the adoption of the Constitution, there were no persons who could
be citizens of it, except those who were citizens of the several
States.
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Our Federal Government is one of special powers. It can
exercise no authority except over the subjects especially committed
to its care; and every power not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, or prohibited by it, is reserved to the States. The
only provision in the Federal Constitution in regard to citizenship,
is that which authorizes Congress "to establish an uniform rule
of naturalization." Under this provision, Congress passed a law
soon after the adoption of the Constitution, prescribing the terms
and manner in which any alien may become "a citizen of the United
States, or any of them." The Constitution of the United States is
silent on the subject of citizenship by birth, and Congress has passed
no law on that subject. Hence citizenship of the United States,
by birth, rests on the general principle that all persons born within
the limits of the United States are citizens thereof. As there were
none such at the adoption of the Federal Constitution, except native
citizens of the several States, they become, like citizens of the
United States. The constitution recognizes the two classes of
citizens above mentioned, by the provisions, that no person shall
be a representative unless he has been seven years a citizen of the
United States; nor a senator, unless he has been nine years a citizen
of the United States; nor president, unless a natural born citizen, or a
citizen of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution.
No power was prohibited to the States respecting citizenship
except so far as the adoption of aliens was concerned. The States
were left, and now are sovereign in respect to the citizenship of all
persons except aliens. With that exception, each State may declare
by law who shall, and who shall not be citizens of it. A naturalized
citizen, by residence in a State, becomes a citizen thereof Gassies v.
Ballou, 6 Pet. R., 762. But each State may determine by law,
what rights and privileges the citizens, or any class of citizens
thereof, shall have and enjoy in it. By the Constitution of the
United States, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The
-rights, which the citizen of a State hgs to resort to the court of the
United States, is not confined to controversies between citizens of
different States but extends to several other kinds of controversies,

SCOTT vs. SANDFORD.

and is an important and valuable right.' Ience the power of a
State to declare who shall and who shall not be a citizen thereof,
has an exceedingly high value under the Constitution of the United
States, in addition to the rights and privileges, which may be conferred by the State, and held and enjoyed within it.
The foregoing presents the true position of citizenship in this
country, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution, to the
promulgation of the opinions of the majority of the judges in this
case of Scott.
The first, and controlling question in the case we are considering was, whether Scott was a citizen of the State of Missouri. Chief
Justice Taney discusses it elaborately, and states the conclusions of
himself and the Justices who concurred with him, in the following
words: "And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject,
the court is of opinion, that upon the facts in the plea in abatement,
Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such, to sue
in its courts, and consequently, that the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment of that court on the
plea in abatement is erroneous." (19 How. R., 427.)
As the State of Missouri had the sole right to determine who should
and who should not be citizens thereof, (other than naturalized
citizens of the United States, of whom it was not pretended Scott
was one,) if the Chief Justice had confined his inquiry to the
ascertainment of the fact, whether by the constitution and laws of
that State, as expounded by her courts, Scott was not a citizen of
Missouri, "because he was a negro of African descent, his ancestors
of pure African blood, and brought into this country and sold as
as slaves," then the opinions of himself and his concurring associates would have made no change in the powers and rights of the
States in respect to citizenship. But the Chief Justice, did not
1 A citizen of the United States, as such, has no right to sue in the United States

Courts; but it' he is a resident of, or identified with, any State in the Union, he has
a right to sue in the Federal Courts, and cannot be deprived of that right, unless
he is shown to be a mere wanderer without a hone. Opinion of Trio zrso-, Justice, in Rabaud vs. De Wolfe, 1 Paine C. C. R. 583.
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confine himself to that inquiry. He commenced his discussion of the
question of jurisdiction raised by the plea in abatement, by stating
that "The question is simply this; can a negro, whose ancestors
were imported into this country and sold as slaves become a
member of the political community formed and brought into
existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities,
guarantied by that instrument to the citizen-one of which rights
is, the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases
specified in the Constitution." After remarking, that the plea in
abatement "applies to that class of persons only, whose ancestors
were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country,
and sold and held as slaves," the Chief Justice proceeds and restates the question as follows: "The only matter in issue before the
court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, -when
they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had
become free before their birth, are citizens of a State in the sense
in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United
States." (19 How. R, 403.)
The Chief Justice then proceeds to show, by various modes of
reasoning, that free colored persons of the class mentioned belonged
to a degraded race, when the Federal Constitution was adoptedwere not a portion of the community intended to be protected by
the government then instituted-and, in his own words, "had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect." (19 How. R.,
407.) He then maintains, by like modes of reasoning that their condition has not since been changed, and concludes, that they are not
citizens of the United States, and are not, and cannot become
citizens of a State, so as to be entitled to sue in the courts of the
United States.
This last proposition, viz., that they are not citizens of a State,
and cannot become such, coming in conflict with the power reserved
to the States to determine who shall and who shall not be citizens
thereof, the Chief Justice, speaking, as already mentioned, for himself and his four concurring associates, states and maintains the
proposition, "that the Constitution of the United States, upon its
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adoption, took from the States all power, by any subsequent legislation, to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the
United States any one, no matter where he was born, or what might
be his character or condition." 19 How. R., 418. If this proposition was clothed with judicial authority, so as to have become the
law of the land, the several States of the Union would be deprived
by it of one of their important and valuable sovereign rights.
We should not omit to notice here, that in this case it was not
alleged or even suggested, that there had been any legislation by
the State of Missouri subsequent to the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, affecting in the least Scott's right of citizenship ; indeed, the proposition, in the form stated, was inapplicable to Missouri, as she did not commence her existence as a State until more
than thirty years after the Constitution was adopted. But there
had been such legislation in the State of Massachusetts, under
which colored citizens of that State had claimed, under the Constitution of the United States, their rights as citizens of one of the
States of the Union, in some of the slave States, and their rights
had been in those States not only denied, but a fair trial of them
prevented. 1
In this connection, and before proceeding to examine and give
an exposition of the opinions of the majority of the judges on the
question, whether Scott, his wife and their daughters, were slaves,
it is proper to state two principles of law, well established.
First.-The decision of a court is a binding authority only on
the point or proposition, upon which the case necessarily turned,
and was decided.
Second.-An opinion expressed or a proposition stated by a judge
in delivering his opinion, which is not necessarily involved in the
decision of the case before the court for judgment, is "an opinion
1 The right which a citizen of one State has in another State, under the Federal

Constitution, came under review before Justice Washington, of the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of Lessee of Butler vs. Fansworth, 4 Wash. C. C.
R., 102-3, and Justice Washington says, "With

respect to the immunities which

the rights of citizenship can confer, the citizen of one State is to be considered as
a citizen of each and every other State in the Union."

SCOTT vs. SANDFORD.

given in passing, and which, not applying judicially to the case, is
not to be resorted to as an authority."
In this connection attention should be given to the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, which give the federal courts
their jurisdiction.
By article 3, section 1, "The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." By the
same article, section 2, "The judicial power shall extend to controversies between citizens of different States."
From these provisions of the Constitution, it is obviously immaterial, on a question of jurisdiction in the federal courts, in what
court the action is pending, whether in the supreme or an inferior
court, for the question is not, which of the courts of the United
States has authority to hear and decide the given case, but whether
the judicial power of the United States extends to the case, in
*whatever court it may be pending. So in this case, when the court
decided, that Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, they
decided, that this was not a case to which the judicial power of the
United States extended, and of course, no court of the United
States had jurisdiction over it.
After announcing the conclusion above stated, that Scott was not
a citizen of the State of Missouri, and consequently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment
of that court sustaining its jurisdiction, was erroneous and must be
reversed, the chief justice speaking, let it always be remembered,
for himself and his concurring associates, proceeds to discuss and
decide the case on the merits, and determine whether Scott was
a slave; asserting the right and duty to do so on two groundsone, that if Scott was a slave, he was not a citizen, and for that
additional reason had not a right to commence this suit in a court
of the United States-the other, that the Supreme Court has a
right, and it is its duty, to review the decisions of the Circuit Court,
and as that court had decided this case on the merits and adjudged
that Scott was a slave, the Supreme Court ought to review that
question and ascertain if it was rightly decided.
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The chief justice presented a most elaborate argument to prove
that Scott was a slave, and in the course of that argument expresses
several very important opinions.
.irst.-The opinion is given, that the provision in the third section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,
respecting the territory thereof, in the following words, viz.-" The
Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules
and regulations, respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States"-was only applicable to the territory owned
by the United States when the Constitution was adopted, and did
not apply to any territory subsequently acquired, (19 How. R1., 432,
436, 441, 442;) and that over territory, acquired subsequently to
the adoption of the constitution, Congress has not full power of
legislation. 19 How. R., 447 to 450.
Previous to the announcement of this opinion, the general, and I
think it should be said, the universal understanding of the country,
and of the different departments of the General Government, was,
that the clause in the Constitution above mentioned did apply to all
the territories of the United States, whenever and however acquired,
and gave Congress full power to legislate concerning them, without
reference to the time when the right to them was acquired.
In this connection, we should recall and keep in view the fact,
that Congress has exercised full power of legislation over all the
territories of the United States, from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time; and that, too, without any reference to
the time when they were acquired.
Second.-The opinion is given, that there is no "difference between property in a slave and other property ;" that each is entitled
to the same protection, and stands on the same footing under our
Constitution and laws. 19 How. R., 451, 452.
Before this opinion was announced, the universal understanding
of the country was, that there was a broad distinction between the
two kinds of property in many important and marked respects, but
palpably and especially in this, that while property in lands and
chattels was recognized throughout the whole country, and in every
State of the Union, it was with equal universality acknowledged,
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that property in a slave was against natural right, and could only
exist by positive law; that such law could have no operation beyond
the limits of the State which enacted it; and that if the slave passed
beyond those limits, he was free, with this single qualification, viz.,
if he escaped from servitude into another state of our Union, his
master, under a provision of the Constitution of the United States,
might reclaim him.
Third.-The opinion is given, that the Constitution of the United
States extends to the territories thereof. 19 How. R., 449, 450.
Before this opinion was announced, the understanding of the country, it is believed, was universal, that the Constitution of the United
States was made for the States, and for them only; that it did not,
and could not, by its very terms, include the territories. It was
made by "The People of the United States" "for the United
States of America ;" and "in order to form a more perfect union"
between the States. All its provisions relate to the States and citizens thereof. The territories are the property of the United States,.
and remain their property till they become States and are admitted
into the Union. When so admitted, they come under the Federal
Constitution, and are governed and protected by it, and not till
then. While the property of the United States, Congress exercises
over them plenary power of legislation, not only under the clause
in the Constitution giving Congress power to "make all needful
rules and regulations, respecting the territory" of the United States,
but by virtue of the sovereign power which the United States has
over the territories belonging to them. This sovereign power has
been freely exercised from the beginning of the government, without any regard to the provisions of the Constitution.
_Yourth.-The opinion is given, that Congress has not power to
prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States acquired
since the adoption of the Constitution, and that the owners of slaves
have a right to take their slaves into such territories and hold them
there in servitude, (19 How. R., 449 to 452,) and that the law of
Congress, which prohibited slavery in the territories of the United
States north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, called the Missouri Compromise, (those territories having
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been acquired since the adoption of the Constitution), was unconstitutional and void.' 19 How. R., 452.
Previous to the announcement of this opinion, the general understanding of the country was, that Congress had power to prohibit
slavery in all the territories of the United States, and without reference to the time when they were acquireld-that the owners of slaves
had not a right to take them into a territory of the United States,
where slavery did not exist by law, and if they did, the slaves became free-and that the law, prohibiting slavery in the territories
of the United States north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes
of north latitude, was constitutional and valid.
In this connection, and to enable us to understand fully and
judge correctly of the opinion above stated, we should remember
and keep in view, the fact, that Congress has, in nine instances, and
by as many separate laws, prohibited slavery in the territories of
the United States; the first act being passed in August, 1789, and
the last one in August, 1848. Four of them prohibited slavery in
territory acquired since the adoption of the Constitution; also the
fact, that the Constitution of the United States contains a provision,
that "No State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts." A vested right is a contract executed; and the courts of
the United States, by a series of decisions, have established the
principle, that a State cannot, either by a law of its Legislature, or
a clause in its constitution, destroy or injuriously disturb a vested
right, as that would impair the obligation of a contract. Hence, if
the owners of slaves may take them into a territory of the United
States and hold them there, as they may other property, that territory, when it becomes a State, cannot by a provision in its constitution, or a law of its Legislature, put an end to slavery within it;
also the fact, that if a citizen of a slave State, say of Georgia,
being the owner of slaves under and by virtue of the laws of that
State, has a right to take them into a territory of the United States
and hold them there, while it is a territory, and after it becomes a
State, he so holds them by virtue of the laws of Georgia; and thus

I Mr. Justice

Catron, while concurring in this opinion, placed his own, on rea-

sons different from those of his associates.
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effect is given to laws of that State, not only beyond the limits of
the State, but in a territory of the United States, and in another
State of the Union; also, and lastly, the fact, that the law, called
the "Missouri Compromise," was not only acquiesced in from its
passage in 1820, to its repeal in 1854, but was re-enacted in 1845,
when Texas was admitted into the Union.
.Fiftlh.-The opinion is given, that the taking of Scott by his
master into the State of Illinois, where slavery is forbidden by its
constitution and laws, and holding him there in servitude nearly
two years, did not emancipate him.
Previous to the announcement of this opinion, the general, and I
believe the universal understanding of the country was, that the
great and noble principle of the common law prevailed in all the
free States of this Union ; that as soon as a slave placed his foot on
free soil, he became a freeman ; and that the only modification of
this principle was in the provision of our federal constitution, before
mentioned, which entitles a master to a return of hib slave, when he
escapes from his service into another State.
To form a correct judgment respecting the fifth opinion above
stated, we must call to mind the obvious results which follow from
it. If an owner of slaves can take them into a free State for a
temporary purpose, or residence, without thereby dissolving the
relation of master and slave, and emancipating them, then the law
of the slave State, under and by virtue of which they are his slaves,
has an operation, not only beyond the limits of that slave State, but
actually in another sovereign State of the Union ; and thus compels
the latter State to tolerate slavery within its borders and against its
will. If an owner of slaves can hold them in a free State for the
length of time the owner ot Scott held him in Illinois, without
thereby emancipating them, there seems to be nothing to prevent
an owner from taking his slaves into a free State and holding them
for any length of time and for any purpose, provided he does not
intend to become a permanent resident of the free State, and designs at some future day to return with his slaves to the slave State
from which he came, or go to some other slave State. In this way
slave labor may be brought into contact and competition with free
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labor in the free States. An owner of slaves may take a contract
on a canal or railroad in a free State, and bring his slaves there to
do the work. And if property in a slave stands on the same footing
under the constitution and laws as property in lands and chattels,
as the majority of the judges hold that it does, it would seem to
follow, that a slave may be taken and held anywhere, in any State,
and for any length of time, that a citizen may take and hold his
carriage or his horse.
After expressing the opinions above stated, and making full and
elaborate arguments to sustain them, the chief justice states the
final judgment of the court to be, that Scott is not a citizen of the
State of Missouri, "and that the Circuit Court of the United
States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction of the case, and could
give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant (Sandford)
must consequently be reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the
suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." 19 How. R. 454.
Justices Nelson of New York, and Grier of Pennsylvania, expressed no opinion on the question of jurisdiction, not considering
it before the court, but discussed the case on the merits, viz., whether Scott was a slave, and were of opinion that that question should
be determined by the laws of Missouri, and after a full examination
of the constitution, laws and decisions of that State, came to the
conclusion, that by them Scott was a slave, and they were in favor
of affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court. 19 How. R. 469.
Justices McLean of Ohio, and Curtis of Massachusetts, discussed
most elaborately all the questions which arose in the cause, and took
opposite views and expressed opposite opinions on all of them, to
the majority of the judges. Their opinions were, that Scott was a
citizen of the State of Missouri, and had a right to sue Sandford in
the courts of the United States; and as those courts had jurisdiction
of the cause, they were bound to examine and decide it ,on the
merits. They accordingly did examine the question, whether Scott
was a slave, and came to the conclusion that he was a freeman; and
as the Circuit Court had decided that Scott was a slave, they were
of opinion, that for that reason the judgment of that court was
erroneous, and ought to be reversed.

